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On December 22, 2020, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Selahattin Demirta# v. Turkey (no.
2) concerning the pre-trial detention of Selahattin Demirta#. It held that Mr.
Demirta#’ pre-trial detention violated his right to liberty (Art. 5 ECHR), his freedom
of expression (Art. 10 ECHR) and his right to stand for election and sit as a member
of parliament (Art. 3 AP 1 ECHR). Additionally, the Court found that the pre-trial
detention pursued an ulterior political motive and therefore violated the prohibition of
the misuse of power (Art. 18 ECHR). As a result, the Court ordered the immediate
release of Mr. Demirta# under Art. 46 ECHR.
While other aspects of the judgment have been discussed elsewhere, this post takes
a closer look at the Court’s assessment of the constitutional amendment lifting Mr.
Demirta#’ immunity. Applying an expanded notion of foreseeability within its ruling
on Art. 10 ECHR, the Grand Chamber was able to condemn the amendment as a
violation of the rule of law. However, the combination of foreseeability with a rule of
law assessment is unconvincing and was not even necessary, as there were better
ways to address the amendment.
The facts: Criminal charges, parliamentary immunity and various detentions
On 4 November 2016, Mr. Demirta#, a member of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly and the (then) co-chair of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), was
arrested on charges of public incitement to commit an offence and membership
of an armed terrorist organization. These charges were based on tweets calling
for protests in 2014 in the face of the Daesh attack on Kobani, his speeches and
statements asking for self-governance for the Kurdish population in Turkey and his
heavy critique of the government’s policies regarding the Kurdish population (see
paras 70, 79).
As a member of the National Assembly, Mr. Demirta# originally enjoyed
parliamentary immunity in the form of inviolability and non-liability (Art. 83 of the
Turkish constitution). Inviolability offers sitting members of parliament protection
against investigations or arrest.
However, in May 2016 a constitutional amendment substantially scaled back the
protection offered by Art. 83. The amendment lifted the inviolability in all cases where
the prosecution has made a request to that end prior to the amendment. Per its entry
into force, 154 members of parliament, including Mr. Demirta#, lost their inviolability
(para. 57). As it was a constitutional amendment that brought about the lifting, the
affected parliamentarians were deprived of procedural safeguards and remedies that
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are normally available to them when their immunity is lifted by a vote of parliament
(paras. 266 et seq.).
As a consequence, the domestic authorities proceed with their investigations against
Mr. Demirta#, leading to his arrest. While the criminal case is still pending, the
domestic courts ordered Mr. Demirta#’ release on 2 September 2019 (paras. 93 et
seq.). However, because of another pending investigation, Mr. Demirta# remains in
pre-trial detention until today (paras. 114 et seq.).
Lifting of inviolability and prosecution as an interference with Art. 10 ECHR
The Grand Chamber faced a delicate situation: A member state prosecuted and
arrested a leading opposition politician for statements that were – in the eyes
of the Court –political speeches covered by freedom of expression (paras. 280,
327 et seq.). In its judgment, the Grand Chamber therefore gave great weight
to a potential violation of freedom of expression (which the chamber found
unnecessary to examine, see para. 275). Taking into account “the combination of
all measures” (para. 247) it found an interference with Art. 10. It considered the fact
that the charges against Mr. Demirta# were based almost exclusively on his political
speeches and the pre-trial detention, but also the constitutional amendment lifting
inviolability (paras. 246 et seq.).
The constitutional amendment – an unforeseeable violation of the rule of law
The Court then went on to find that the interference had not been prescribed
by law and was therefore unjustified. Here, the Court continued to focus on the
constitutional amendment. The Court addressed the amendment under the heading
of foreseeability and concluded that it had been unforeseeable because it violated
the rule of law (paras. 264 et seq.).
More specifically, the Court found the amendment to be an unprecedented “one-off
ad homines amendment”, as it was – according to its preamble – directed against
“certain members of parliament (…) [that] have made speeches voicing moral
support for terrorism, have provided de facto support and assistance to terrorism
and terrorists [and] have called for violence” (paras. 56, 268 et seq.). Because it
held previously that ad homineslaws raise issues under the rule of law (see Baka
v. Hungary, para. 117), the Court concluded that the amendment violates the rule
of law and constitutes a “misuse of the constitutional amendment procedure” (para.
269).
The Court then linked this finding back to the issue of foreseeability by stating that
“a member of parliament [note the abstract phrasing here!] could not reasonably
expect” such an amendment (para. 269). This (of course) also encompasses
Mr. Demirta#, who could have legitimately expected to enjoy the benefit of the
constitutional framework granting inviolability against criminal proceedings (para.
270).
 Violations of the rule of law as an issue of foreseeability?
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This combination of foreseeability and rule of law compliance is novel. The Court has
not only never examined a law’s legality under the heading of foreseeability. Such an
examination also goes beyond a ‘classical’ reading of foreseeability.
As also explained in the judgment, foreseeability is usually understood as a concept
focused on the application of domestic laws by domestic courts (paras. 249 et
seq.). The Court’s application of the foreseeability concept to the amendment in this
case differs from such a reading. The Court did not review the application of the
amendment, but the amendment itself for its compliance with the rule of law.
Thereby, the Court extended the scope of foreseeability to encompass the rule of
law conformity of new laws.
However, this approach is confusing for two reasons.
First, legislative changes do not normally raise issues for lack of foreseeability.
On the contrary, one cannot usually expect the law to remain unchanged. Put
bluntly, legal and even more constitutional changes “rarely meet the requirement of
foreseeability” (Judge Wojtyczek, Partly Concurring, Partly Dissenting Opinion, para.
6). Therefore, the category of foreseeability generally does not seem fitting to assess
legislative changes.
Second, the Court did actually not take issue with the fact that there had been
a legislative change as such. Instead, the Court held that there is a lack of
foreseeability because the amendment violated the rule of law (and not because it
had been introduced subsequently).
In fact, the Court’s assessment of the amendment’s foreseeability was basically
just an assessment of its compliance with the rule of law. While the Court drew a
line between the rule of law and foreseeability (legislative changes violating the rule
of law are not foreseeable), it did not explain this connection. Therefore, it almost
seems as if the Court just employed the notion of foreseeability to examine the
constitutional amendment and its compliance with the rule of law without looking at
questions actually relating to the concept of foreseeability. This makes the Court’s
approach all the more questionable.
Alternative ways to review the amendment?
The Court’s surprising approach was not not for a lack of alternatives to reach a
finding on the amendment. While it was not possible to review the amendment by
itself due to the six-month rule, one can still think of several alternative ways that
seem less doubtful than the foreseeability approach. More precisely, there were at
least two ‘smaller’ and one ‘big’ alternative.
The ‘smaller’ alternatives relate to the interpretation of Convention rights. First, the
Court could have (somewhat pragmatically) examined whether the constitutional
amendment constitutes a law in the sense of Art. 10 para. 2 ECHR. The Court has
held previously that laws that violate the rule of law cannot be considered laws
in that sense (Baka v. Hungary, para. 154). As the Court already addresses the
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amendment under the heading of ‘prescribed by law’ (para. 255), one can only
wonder why the Court chose the path of foreseeability instead of reviewing the
amendment’s compliance with the rule of law just like that.
Second, the Court could have reviewed the constitutional amendment under Art.
3 AP 1 ECHR (right to vote and sit as an MP). As the Court itself stated that “the
rule of parliamentary immunity (…) is crucial to this guarantee [the right to sit as an
MP]” (para. 386), shouldn’t this allow for a review of a lifting of immunity such as the
one executed via constitutional amendment, especially when such lifting leads to a
parliamentarian’s arrest?
The ‘big’ alternative concerns the review of chamber admissibility decisions and
the fact that the amendment could have been addressed more easily under Art. 5
ECHR (lawfulness of the detention). Under this heading, the Court regularly reviews
the compliance of the applicable domestic laws with the Convention and the rule
of law (Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, para. 134; Merabishvili v.
Georgia, para. 186). However, the chamber had declared this part of the application
inadmissible by deferring fully to the assessment made by the national authorities,
namely the Turkish Constitutional Court (paras. 142 et seq.).
The Grand Chamber deems such decisions not reviewable (para. 167). However,
the Grand Chamber’s clear condemnation of the constitutional amendment renders
the chamber’s findings to that end rather questionable. Hence, the present case
offered the Grand Chamber the opportunity to change its jurisprudence on the
reviewability of admissibility decisions. By allowing for the review of admissibility
decisions (demanded also by Judge Wojtyczek, Partly Concurring, Partly Dissenting
Opinion, para. 2), the Grand Chamber could have revisited the question of the
constitutional amendment under Art. 5. More generally, it could have ensured a
coherent application of the Convention, as admissibility decisions can be very
controversial (see e.g. Kuri# and Others v. Slovenia).
Conclusion: Strong message, unforeseeable future
The Court held that a constitutional (!) amendment violates the rule of law. This
sends a very strong signal, not only for the importance of the rule of law in general,
but in particular for all pending criminal proceedings against Turkish parliamentarians
whose immunity had been lifted by the amendment. As applaudable as this message
is, the Grand Chamber could have achieved the same result by less questionable
means instead of adopting an unpersuasive expansion of the notion of foreseeability.
One has to wait for future cases to see what this interpretation really means. As
the notion of foreseeability can be found in various Convention provisions, future
applicants will certainly take up the Court’s approach in very different cases.
Hopefully, the Court will then continue or even expand its review of domestic
legislation for compliance with the rule of law. At the same time, the Court should
not forget about systematic coherency and therefore refrain from doing so under an
expanded notion of foreseeability.
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